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Abstract
The BRRD and the SRM Regulation established a bank resolution framework that interacts with rather
than replaces more general rules of national insolvency law. Policy and academic discussions recognise a
need for further alignment of national insolvency laws across the EU with the existing bank resolution
framework but at the same time doubts exist whether a full-fledged harmonisation of insolvency law is
feasible. Using the legal theory of coherence in a legal system, this article analyses to what extent the bail-
in rules are already aligned with and how they are embedded into more general areas of Dutch private law,
in particular insolvency law. It shows that with regard to specific aspects of the interaction between the
bail-in rules and Dutch private law amendment or clarification is needed to avoid uncertainties about the
application of bail-in and related safeguards for shareholders and creditors. These observations might be
valid for other EU Member States as well.
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1. Introduction
One of the key lessons of the recent financial crisis for policymakers within the European Union (‘EU’)
was that the existing bank (credit institution) 1  insolvency rules needed to be drastically amended. It was
generally felt that the fact that a fully harmonised bank-specific insolvency framework did not exist within
the EU stood in sharp contrast with the increased international activities and interconnectedness of the
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European banking sector. 2  Moreover, in most Member States the bank insolvency regime was broadly
similar to the ordinary corporate insolvency regime, if special bank insolvency rules did exist at al. 3  Where
early intervention measures had been proven insufficient to restore a bank's financial viability, under the
applicable insolvency laws the failing bank would generally be subject to a reorganisation or liquidation
procedure in which courts were typically attributed an important role. 4  The fact that during the financial
crisis authorities decided to bail-out several failing banks with taxpayers' money because the opening of
such a formal insolvency procedure 5  in respect of these banks could have undesirable effects, has been
argued to clash with the idea that the failure of a company, including a bank, needs to be dealt with by
insolvency law. 6  Conceptually, insolvency law fulfils — so the argument runs — a crucial and necessary
role in market economies because it determines the consequences of commercial and financial failure and
follows clear priority rules, while the management and shareholders are not spared from the consequences
of risky decisions. 7
Against this background, the bank resolution rules that have recently been introduced at EU level seek
to find a compromise between objectives that have often been presented as being at different ends of the
spectrum. 8  These include on the one hand the objectives of ensuring the continuity of critical functions
of a failing bank as well as financial stability, and on the other hand the objectives to limit the implicit
guarantee that a bank will always be rescued with public (taxpayers') money and incentivise shareholders
and creditors to become more alert about the bank's risk-taking. 9  The former are likely to be pursued in
case of a guarantee by a government of all debts, while liquidation under the applicable insolvency laws
may have a favourable effect on market discipline. 10  The EU bank resolution rules aim to replicate the
economic effects of a traditional insolvency procedure for a failing bank's shareholders and creditors and
recognise several principles of insolvency law, while the effects of a bank failure on the financial system
and the wider economy are taken into account. 11  They establish an administrative, non-judicial bank
resolution procedure in which a resolution authority is allowed to intervene in and restructure a bank
which is considered failing or likely to fail, with a view to safeguard its essential services and functions,
including its deposit portfolio, and make other parts subject to a controlled wind-down. 12  The rules can be
found in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 13  (‘BRRD’) and the Single Resolution Mechanism
Regulation 14  (‘SRM Regulation’). 15  The former, which applies to the EU as a whole and had to be
implemented in national law before 1 January 2015, provides for a harmonised set of rules on the resolution
of failing banks, investment firms and certain other financial institutions at Member State level as well as
the cooperation between national authorities. 16  Under the latter, a new agency in Brussels, Belgium, i.e. the
Single Resolution Board, applies many of the BRRD's resolution rules — to a large extent since 1 January
2016 — in a unified and centralised resolution procedure for the larger and cross-border operating banks
in the nineteen EU Member States that form the Euro Area. 17
Bank resolution rules and their interaction with more general areas of national private law
Literature presents the new bank resolution regime and more general insolvency law often as distinct
disciplines and a bank resolution procedure under the BRRD and SRM Regulation is portrayed as an
alternative to a formal insolvency procedure. 18  Indeed, looking at the public interests involved in a bank
failure, as regards most banks the application of the new resolution tools and powers is likely to be the
preferred course of action rather than the commencement of a liquidation procedure 19  for the failing bank
as a whole. Yet, the distinction between the bank resolution rules and general insolvency law becomes less
clear once ‘insolvency’ is regarded as a broad concept and umbrella term that does not necessarily require
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that the traditional requirements of balance sheet or cash flow insolvency are met but is in relation to
a bank dependent on the assessment of supervisory and resolution authorities whether it is for instance
sufficiently capitalised to be allowed to continue operating. 20  As noted above, the ultimate objectives of
the bank resolution rules are to a certain extent different than the traditional objectives of more general
insolvency law. Yet, most of their underlying principles are principles of insolvency law. 21  Moreover,
although insolvency lawyers may be unknown with some specific terms that are used by the bank resolution
rules, 22  a bank resolution procedure can have elements of both reorganisation and liquidation. 23  As will be
examined below, substantial legislative changes to general corporate insolvency law have been made or have
been proposed in EU Member States to supplement traditional liquidation procedures with a procedure
that is directed towards some form of reorganisation or restructuring. 24  Both more general insolvency law
in many jurisdictions and the bank resolution rules focus now on the prevention or streamlining of a debtor's
insolvency. 25  In general, it seems preferable to classify bank resolution law as a special part of insolvency
law in a jurisdiction. 26
While literature also discusses the bank resolution rules often from a regulatory and banking supervisory
perspective, 27  the rules rely heavily on more general rules of private law for their interpretation and
application. 28  For instance, the BRRD and SRM Regulation explicitly refer to national private law,
and especially more general insolvency law. They provide, inter alia, that a failing bank should only be
subject to a resolution procedure if the bank cannot be liquidated under insolvency law, 29  while the
application of bail-in is required to follow to a certain extent the ranking of claims recognised under
national insolvency law. 30  Even in cases for which these references are not explicitly made at EU level, the
bank resolution rules are expected to interact directly with more general areas of private law at national
level. For example, according to the Dutch resolution authority, De Nederlandsche Bank (‘DNB’), a write-
down and cancellation of a bank's existing shares in the application of the bail-in mechanism requires the
immediate issuance of new shares because under Dutch company law a public limited company (Naamloze
Vennootschap) must have shareholders at all times. 31
The special position of banks in EU insolvency legislation has received attention before. Since its
introduction sixteen years ago, the Winding-up Directive, 32  which is mainly a private international law
instrument rather than an instrument to harmonise substantive bank insolvency law, has been subject to a
debate on its relationship with another EU legislative instrument in the field of cross-border insolvency, i.e.
the Insolvency Regulation. 33  Some authors have argued that the rules of this directive and regulation are
part of a consistent statutory scheme and ‘all form the “hermeneutic circle” within which the interpretations
should be made’, 34  while others have emphasised the special nature of the principles and norms governing
bank failures. 35  Yet, consensus seems to exist that the EU legislature has an important task in safeguarding
the coherence of the EU system of insolvency law, including the alignment of the Winding-up Directive with
the Insolvency Regulation and vice versa. 36
The BRRD and SRM Regulation are now subject to a debate that focuses on the interplay between
the harmonised bank resolution rules and more general areas of national private law, including national
substantive insolvency law. For several scholars, the desirable picture of a bank resolution framework has
been one with consistently implemented and clear rules, a clearly defined priority of claims and a consistent
overall resolution policy. 37  This view seems to be in line with the European legislature's recent efforts
to build a Single Resolution Mechanism (‘SRM’) to avoid substantial discrepancies in the application of
bank resolution rules and policies across participating EU Member States. 38  At the moment, however, it
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is recognised in academic as well as policy discussions that within the EU (and especially within the SRM
participating Member States) there is a need for a further alignment of national insolvency law, in particular
the insolvency order of priority of claims, with the existing bank resolution framework. 39  It is believed that
differences that currently exist between Member States' insolvency laws as well as between these laws and
the applicable resolution framework may, inter alia, negatively affect the predictability of and trust in the
application of bank resolution tools, for instance of creditors who wish to assess the likelihood that their
claims are written down or converted by authorities. These uncertainties about the possible applications of
those tools and related ‘safeguards’ for investors may also cause a higher risk of legal challenges. 40  Yet,
at the same time, it is argued that a full-fledged harmonisation of insolvency law at EU level may not be
possible, particularly because it is closely connected to and intertwined with many other areas of national
law, including property, contract and company law, and reflects national regulatory traditions. 41  An
analysis to what extent the SRM Regulation's and BRRD's bank resolution rules, principles and objectives
are currently already aligned with and how they are now embedded into insolvency law — and even broader:
several more general areas of private law — at national level can therefore be of relevance in discussions
about the way in which the development and harmonisation of the bank insolvency framework can best be
achieved. Yet, such an analysis has not yet received the attention which it deserves.
A coherent system of law
This article is aimed at analysing several relationships between the rules on the most discussed resolution
mechanism available for resolution authorities, which is the bail-in mechanism, and more general areas
of national private law from a legal theoretical perspective. It asks the question to what extent these
relationships can be considered coherent relationships. 42  The bail-in mechanism is in legal literature
considered the ‘innovative Herzstück’, 43  ‘Wunderwaffe’, 44  ‘most controversial weapon among the
guns’ 45  and ‘the most significant regulatory achievement in post-crisis efforts to end “Too Big To Fail”’. 46
It allows authorities to reduce the nominal value of share capital, write-down liabilities and convert liabilities
into share capital of a bank. While this article's analysis also requires an examination of the bail-in rules
as established at EU level, the focus of the assessment in the paragraphs below is how the bail-in rules,
principles and objectives provided by the SRM Regulation, which is by its nature directly applicable at
national level, and the BRRD, as implemented into national law, have found a way to for example adjust
to or exist along with existing legal components of more general areas of national private law. 47  Thus, the
study focuses in particular on the issue of coherence at a horizontal, national level, which issue has been
considered of importance in the context of rules and legal concepts deriving from EU legislative instruments
as they typically only deal with very specific issues and often deviate from terminology and interpretations
traditionally used at national law. 48  Moreover, it mainly draws on Dutch law, but the analysis is expected
to be relevant for other EU Member States than the Netherlands as well. The study made in this contribution
can serve as a basis for other projects assessing — provided that EU competence exists — what should be
included in any EU harmonisation instrument to improve the national relationships, which would especially
deal with the relationship between EU law and more general areas of national law, i.e. a matter of so-called
‘diagonal coherence’. 49
Although the concept of legal coherence in the field of private law is ascribed a variety of different meanings
in literature, 50  here it focuses on the elements that form a system of law and it is considered to serve
important goals such as legal certainty and predictability. 51  At the surface level of the legal system,
coherence requires that the legal components such as principles, rules and cases allow non-contradictory
interpretations and definitions and are logically connected with each other. Moreover, at a deeper level, it
requires a set with some common policy goals and objectives. 52  Yet, it should not always be considered
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equivalent to uniformity. If, for instance, different definitions of a concept or term used in two areas of law
is preferable, for the sake of legal certainty it may be necessary to explicitly provide how the two definitions
relate to each other. 53
The analysis is structured as follows. Paragraph 2 briefly examines conceptual aspects of bail-in from
an often used perspective, which is a mere regulatory and banking supervisory perspective, as well as
from an insolvency law perspective. Paragraph 3 discusses the application of the bail-in mechanism under
the BRRD and the SRM Regulation. The coherence analysis in the next paragraph (paragraph 4) will
be made for selected examples of relationships, which — according to the present author — represent
important relationships between the bail-in rules and more general areas of national private law in view
of the application and interpretation of the rules. The first section (paragraph 4.1) highlights two types of
relationships between Dutch general insolvency law and bank resolution law that should not be considered
problematic taking into account the concept of coherence. Paragraph 4.2 then analyses three aspects of
the application of the bail-in mechanism (the effects of a debt write-down, the effects of conversion of
claims and the hierarchy of claims in bail-in) to illustrate that national or EU legislative action can be
argued necessary to fit bank resolution law better into existing Dutch private law or vice versa. Paragraph
5 concludes and summarises the main points of this article. It is worth noting that although the BRRD
and the SRM Regulation make a distinction between two types of tools for effecting the write-down and
conversion powers, i.e. the write-down and conversion of capital instruments tool and the bail-in tool, 54
the tools are here together referred to as ‘bail-in mechanism’ and their application ‘bail-in’. In addition,
notwithstanding the fact that not all Dutch banks are organised as a public limited company, this article
focuses on this type of company.
2. Conceptual aspects of bail-in from a regulatory and insolvency law perspective
2.1. Bail-in from a regulatory perspective
The function of the share capital any stock company holds to ensure that it can continue its activities in
the foreseeable future has been deemed threefold. The capital, which is provided by the shareholders who
benefit if the company is able to pay dividends but are in insolvency generally only paid after all other
company's creditors, ensures that the company is able to finance its daily activities. In addition, it serves as a
basis for apportioning each shareholder a share in the control over the company. Thirdly, for the company's
creditors it forms a ‘buffer’ and guarantee that the company can fulfil its commitments to a certain extent. 55
In contrast to many other companies, banks are required to hold an adequate level of regulatory capital
that is composed of a layer of share capital as well as a mix of subordinated debt and hybrid capital. 56  In
theory a thick layer of regulatory capital could ensure that in a formal insolvency procedure a bank's losses
are shouldered by shareholders and investors in subordinated debt rather than the bank's depositors and
the wider economy. Outside a formal insolvency procedure, however, the mere subordination of debt may
not provide any help in absorbing unexpected losses. 57  For a non-financial corporate debtor an agreement
with its creditors on a reduction of the nominal value of debt, i.e. a haircut, and/or a conversion of (a part
of) the outstanding debt into one or more classes of share capital, may be a solution if the shareholders are
not willing to invest additional capital and the company is in a troubled state. Yet, for a bank a private
workout may not be feasible if the shareholders and creditors are not willing to cooperate and a solution
needs to be found within a very short period of time. 58  Accordingly, the last several years an important
aspect of the regulatory reforms in the EU was to restrict the instruments that qualify as regulatory capital
to a large extent to those that have a so-called loss absorbing capacity much earlier than the moment the
bank would be balance-sheet insolvent, i.e. it would not have enough assets to pay all debts. 59  Contingent
capital instruments, which include contingent convertible bonds (‘CoCos’) and write-down bonds, acquired
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increasing support from banks and from regulators, economist and academics on a national as well as
global level. 60  These instruments' terms and conditions have a clause which generally provides that they
are written down or converted into common shares or preference shares when a predetermined trigger event
occurs. 61  Under the Capital Requirements Regulation 62  (‘CRR’) capital instruments may only count as
Additional Tier 1 (‘AT1’) instruments if the instruments have a capacity to absorb losses at a trigger point
that relates to a bank's Common Equity Tier 1 (‘CET1’) capital ratio. 63
Against this background, a statutory bail-in mechanism has been considered a supplement to the contingent
capital instruments issued by banks. 64  While the latter are generally triggered if the issuing bank's
operations are still considered going concern, the former may be applied in a wider range of circumstances,
depending on the exercise of discretion by the resolution authority rather than a contractually agreed trigger
event. 65  In practice, the trigger of the application of the contingent capital instruments may not always
precede the application of the bail-in mechanism. A bank's capital providers may even first experience
that the contractual trigger event has occurred and that their instruments are converted into shares, and
subsequently be subject to a statutory bail-in. 66  A significant amount of literature exists examining the
role and goals of bail-in. According to some authors, bail-in is based on a principle of ‘private penalty’ or
‘private insurance’ as it seeks to ensure that bank losses are imposed on the persons who provide the bank's
regulatory capital. 67  Moreover, it has been argued that the concept aims to facilitate a swift reorganisation
of a failing bank's balance sheet, 68  while others have stated that it may not only be of relevance if a bank has
solvency problems but it can also fulfil an important role in overcoming panic in the markets and run risks at
an earlier stage. 69  While shareholders are granted economic rights as well as control and governance rights
and are traditionally the first the bear losses up to the amount of their investments, a bank's investors in
subordinated debt instruments are typically only granted contractual rights but now also run the risk to be
called at an early stage to shoulder the bank's losses and to lose their investments. It has been submitted that
this development requires the reform of company law to ensure that both the bank's shareholders as well as
the bondholder and other debt holders are entitled to participate in the decision-making procedures and are
able to control and monitor the management of the bank. 70  Yet according to others, granting bondholders
voting rights would not contribute to achieving relevant objectives such as preventing the bank's insolvency
and overcoming shareholder pressure on management to accept high levels of risks. 71
2.2. Bail-in from an insolvency law perspective
From a mere insolvency law perspective, 72  a statutory bail-in mechanism to be applied by administrative
authorities creates a special type of debt restructuring procedure for banks. The concept of bail-in may
remind insolvency lawyers of the so-called ‘chameleon equity firm’, which was proposed by Adler many
years ago. 73  In brief, this company would issue debt in several tranches and when it would show signs of
financial distress the claims in the high-priority classes are retained but only to the extent these obligations
can be fulfilled. The claims with the highest priority ranking that cannot be paid are automatically
converted into equity, whereas the remaining lower-priority tranches, including the original equity class,
are automatically wiped out, as was contractually specified. In this way, the firm is able to continue
its operations with the lower-priority creditors having control over the firm. 74  In a similar form, the
application of a bail-in mechanism replicates a debt restructuring procedure governed by general company
and insolvency law in which the nominal value of the share capital and claims against the company is
reduced and creditors' claims are converted into equity interests in the company's capital. 75  Creditors may
receive shares in the company or warrants or other options to subscribe for shares in the company's capital
in exchange for a cancellation of their claims. 76  As is generally the case in a debt-to-equity swap under
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company or insolvency law, the aim of the application of the bail-in mechanism may be the recapitalisation
of either the existing company or a new entity that receives assets and liabilities of the existing company. 77
Moreover, the bail-in rules create a kind of pre-packaged procedure in the sense that the debt restructuring
is based on the resolution strategy agreed by the relevant resolution authorities beforehand in so-called
resolution plans. 78  To be sure, while under insolvency law the decision whether a company is liquidated
or reorganised traditionally depends on the question in which way the most proceeds are generated for the
creditors, 79  the decision whether a bank should be placed under resolution rather than liquidated as well
as which measures are taken is especially dependent on the assessment of the public interests involved. 80
At that stage a resolution authority is allowed to implement a bail-in even if the shareholders and creditors
would not have agreed with the measures. Such a ‘cram down’ by administrative decision can, according
to several scholars, be justified taking into account famous insolvency law theories, including the theory
on anti-commons behaviour. In short, it is believed that a failing bank's shareholders and creditors would
withhold their consent to any proposed composition or reorganisation plan if they expect a possible rescue
of the bank by the government, in which case they think to be better off than in a liquidation of the bank's
assets. 81  Needless to say, this does not mean that a private sector recapitalisation effort cannot be launched
before a bank resolution procedure is opened by asking shareholders and creditors to consent to a debt-
to-equity swap. 82
3. Bail-in as codified in the BRRD and the SRM Regulation
Drawing heavily on the standards and principles of international standard-setters, 83  in the EU, like
in countries such as the United States, 84  in its wide-scale overhaul of the supervisory and regulatory
framework since the most recent global financial crisis considerable attention has been paid to the expansion
of the tools and powers available for authorities to orderly resolve a failing bank. 85  The SRM is one of the
results of the efforts made to establish a comprehensive and further harmonised bank insolvency regime and
is the second pillar of the Euro Area's Banking Union, in which the European Central Bank's centralised
banking supervision within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (‘SSM’) constitutes the first pillar. 86  In
contrast to the BRRD, which, as it is a directive, empowers the national legislatures of all EU Member States
to transpose its rules into national law and allows a certain amount of discretion to national authorities in
the application of the resolution tools and powers, 87  the SRM Regulation has direct legal effect. It builds on
the resolution framework created by the BRRD, which rules are also applied in EU Member States that are
not part of the Banking Union. Under the SRM Regulation the Single Resolution Board adopts all decisions
relating to the resolution of large and cross-border operating banks, 88  which are then implemented by the
relevant resolution authorities at national level based on national law transposing the BRRD and may be
supported by the Single Resolution Fund. 89
The BRRD requires Member States to designate a public administrative authority that performs all
resolution functions and tasks and closely cooperates with, inter alia, the relevant supervisory authorities. 90
In many Member States, including the Netherlands, the national banking supervisory authority is the
designated resolution authority. 91  According to the resolution rules, the supervisory authority and the
resolution authority, which are in the Euro Area, depending on the size of the bank, either the authorities at
European level or at national level, 92  in principle decide together that all three the conditions for resolution
are met, i.e. a bank is considered failing or likely to fail, the failure cannot be prevented by any alternative
private measure and a resolution action is necessary in the public interests. 93  Hence, a bank may enter
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resolution while it is not (yet) balance-sheet insolvent and it has a positive equity value. 94  The relevant
resolution authority then has a toolbox at its disposal with four so-called ‘resolution tools’ 95  as well as
several ‘resolution powers’ to assist the implementation of the tools, 96  such as the power to amend or alter
the maturity of debt instruments. 97  Besides the bail-in tool 98  the toolbox consist of three tools to arrange
a transfer of (a part of) a bank's assets and liabilities or shares to a private sector purchaser, a bridge bank
or a bad bank respectively. 99
As has been noted above, the BRRD and SRM Regulation divide a resolution authority's bail-in powers
between two different instruments, but many characteristics of the instruments are the same. 100  To ensure
that banks have a sufficient amount of capital instruments and liabilities on their balance sheets that can be
made subject to bail-in, banks are required to meet at all times a minimum requirement for debt instruments
and liabilities that are bail-inable, which is known as ‘MREL’ and is set by the resolution authority. 101
MREL should in principle ensure that losses can be absorbed as well as that the bank can subsequently
be recapitalised, although the recapitalisation requirement does not apply to banks that are expected to be
liquidated if losses have been incurred. 102  First, the write-down or conversion of capital instruments-tool
under Articles 59 and 60 BRRD and Article 21 SRM Regulation is exercised either independently from a
resolution action and before the conditions for resolution are met, or in combination with the application
of the resolution tools where a resolution procedure has already been commenced. 103  Hence, this tool does
not constitute a resolution tool within the definition of the BRRD and SRM Regulation. Its application
has been considered a ‘Kleiner Bail-in’ 104  and precedes and or even prevents the application of the bail-in
tool. 105  The scope of the tool is limited to a write-down and/or conversion of only bank's so-called ‘relevant
capital instruments’, which are AT1 and Tier 2 (‘T2’) instruments. 106  Yet, according to recently published
proposals of the European Commission to amend the BRRD and SRM Regulation, the scope of the tool
should be extended to liabilities that meet the MREL requirements. 107  Secondly, the bail-in tool under
Articles 35 to 55 BRRD and Article 27 SRM Regulation is part of the mentioned resolution authority's
toolbox in a resolution procedure and may be applied for two purposes, notwithstanding the fact that the
authority also needs to be take into account the general resolution objectives and resolution principles. 108
It may be used (i) to recapitalise the bank under resolution or (ii) to capitalise a bridge institution to which
claims or debt instruments of the bank are transferred or complement the application of the resolution tools
to transfer parts of the bank to a private sector purchaser or bad bank. 109  Thus, the measures can be taken
in relation to the existing bank, which approach is generally called an open-bank bail-in, as well as to a
non-operating firm while a part of the business are transferred to a new entity, which is a so-called closed-
bank bail-in. 110  As will be discussed below in paragraph 4.2.3, not all liabilities fall within the scope of
the resolution authority's bail-in powers and the powers are to be applied tranche by tranche, 111  following
to a large extent ‘a reverse order of priority of claims’ 112  under national insolvency law. 113  Moreover,
the amount to be bailed-in and the conversion rate is determined by the resolution authorities based on a
valuation of the bank. 114  Arguably, by placing a bank's AT1 and T2 instruments, which are typically ‘issued
as subordinate, loss-absorbing instruments from the outset’, 115  and according to the recently published
proposals also liabilities that count as MREL within the scope of a separate tool for bail-in, the BRRD and
SRM Regulation underline that holders of these instruments and claims stand at the top rungs of the loss
distribution ladder and the instruments function as additional buffers for a crisis situation. 116
A simple example illustrates the application of the bail-in mechanism under the BRRD and SRM
Regulation. 117  Suppose the ECB as supervisory authority concludes that a bank needs to take a substantial
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loss on its loan book and therefore no longer complies with the regulatory capital requirements. The
conditions for the opening of a resolution procedure are met and the Single Resolution Board adopts a so-
called resolution scheme. 118  This scheme places the bank under resolution and determines the application
of the resolution tools. Based on a valuation of the bank's assets and liabilities as well as a resolvability
assessment that has been made and a resolution plan that has been drawn up beforehand, the Board assesses
which resolution actions need to be taken, what part of the bank's capital should be made subject to bail-
in measures and what should in the end be the capital position of the bank, which is in this case the
‘target’ of the bail-in measures. 119  In this hypothetical case, the resolution authority concludes that bail-
in is not combined with the application of other resolution tools. The resolution scheme enters into force
after the European Commission and the Council have not expressed any objections within a period of 24
hours. 120  The Board then sends the scheme to the relevant national resolution authorities, who implement
the measures in accordance with the BRRD, as transposed into national law. 121  The write-down and
conversion of capital instruments-tool is first applied to reduce the nominal value of the share capital, 122
the reserves and AT1 capital instruments in full to cover the losses and return the difference between the
asset side and liability side of the bank's balance sheet to zero. 123  The next step in this hypothetical bail-
in is the conversion of capital instruments and liabilities into shares or other instruments of ownership,
such as instruments that give the right to acquire shares, 124  to recapitalise the bank and ensure that it
complies with regulatory capital requirements again. 125  By contrast, if the bank would have had a positive
net asset value, which from an economic point of view belongs to its shareholders, the resolution authority
would only exercise its conversion powers. 126  This means that the percentage of control in the bank and
the value of the investments of the existing shareholders may be reduced but the shareholders do not fully
lose their investments. 127  Thus, in relation to a bank that is to be recapitalised the resolution authority is
allowed to exercise its conversion power independently from its power to reduce capital instruments and
liabilities, but the latter power can only be used together with the conversion power. 128  It is worth noting
that the bank resolution rules do not explicitly provide to what extent a resolution authority is empowered
to convert a liability of the bank in another type of liability — such as the conversion of a senior liability in
a subordinated liability that qualifies as AT1 or T2 capital. It has been noted, however, that if a resolution
authority is empowered to convert a claim against the bank into shares in the bank, in theory it may also be
empowered to convert the claim in a less subordinated position such as a subordinated claim. 129  Moreover,
one can also argue that Article 64 BRRD provides for a legal basis for this conversion as it provides that
a resolution authority is empowered to modify the terms of a contract to which the bank under resolution
is a party when exercising one of its resolution powers.
4. Coherence in the national legal system
This paragraph takes a detailed look at specific aspects of the interaction between bail-in under the BRRD
and SRM Regulation on the one hand and more general areas of national private law on the other hand.
Paragraph 4.1 illustrates that Dutch bank resolution law and general corporate insolvency law share some
similar principles and policy goals. Yet, paragraph 4.2 discusses three aspects of bail-in, i.e. the effects of
a debt write-down, the effects of a conversion of claims and the hierarchy of claims followed in bail-in, to
demonstrate that several legal issues and challenges exist in terms of the effects of the application of bail-in
in and its alignment with more general areas of Dutch private law.
4.1. Alignment with certain principles and policy goals of insolvency law
4.1.1. Principles of insolvency law in the bank resolution framework
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The resolution principles that must be taken into account in the application of the bail-in mechanism under
the BRRD and SRM Regulation reveal a first relationship between the bail-in framework and national
insolvency law. At a general level, most of the nine principles listed in Article 34(1) BRRD and Article 15(1)
SRM Regulation are essentially traditional principles of insolvency law. 130  According to the resolution
principles, the bank under resolution's shareholders bear first losses, its creditors bear losses after the
shareholders, to a large extent in accordance with the ranking of claims recognised under national insolvency
law, and creditors in the same class are treated in an equitable manner, unless otherwise provided. This
means that in case of a bail-in losses are to be allocated pro-rata between claims of the same rank. 131
It may remind one for instance of Section 3:277(1) of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek, ‘BW’),
which provides that, in principle, creditors have amongst each other and in proportion to the amount of
their claims an equal right to be paid from the net proceeds of the debtor's assets. Moreover, the Dutch
Insolvency Act (Faillissementswet, ‘Fw’) provides that, apart from certain exceptions, in a suspension of
payments procedure the payment of all debts existing before the commencement of this procedure may
during the procedure only be made to all joint creditors in proportion to their claims. 132  Arguably, the idea
that insolvency risks are allocated to a company's shareholders and creditors is also borrowed from general
insolvency law. 133  By way of illustration, under Section 179 Fw creditors are only distributed any proceeds
in liquidation after a realisation of the debtor's assets available to the unsecured creditors, whereas Section
2:23b BW provides that upon dissolution of a company shareholders are only paid after all creditors' claims
have been satisfied. 134
Other resolution principles are that a bank's management is to be replaced in a resolution procedure and
persons responsible for the failure are held liable under national civil or criminal law. 135  Moreover, a
‘no creditor worse off principle’ (‘ncwo principle’) applies. 136  The BRRD and SRM Regulation require a
valuer to compare the treatment of creditors and shareholders in a resolution procedure with the expected
outcome if the bank at the moment the resolution decision is taken ‘had entered into normal insolvency
proceedings’ under national law, which are apparently considered the only alternative to the resolution
measures. 137  The term is in Section 3a:20 of the Dutch Act on financial supervision (Wet op het financieel
toezicht, ‘Wft’), which is part of the provisions that transpose the BRRD into Dutch law, translated as a
liquidation of the bank that takes place in either a liquidation procedure (faillissement) under the Fw or
bank emergency procedure (noodregeling) under the Wft. It has been argued that with the ncwo principle
the bank resolution rules seek to meet requirements in human rights legislation on interferences with
property rights. 138  Human rights legislation, however, does not require that the safeguards for creditors
and shareholders are based on exactly this principle on the comparison with a hypothetical liquidation
procedure. 139  The ncwo principle as currently in place follows existing concepts of national insolvency law.
For example, under Sections 153(2) and 272(2) Fw, a court denies confirmation (homologatie) of a proposed
composition scheme within a liquidation procedure (a faillissementsakkoord) or within a suspension of
payments procedure (a surséance-akkoord) if the assets of the insolvent estate considerably exceed the sum
proposed in the scheme. According to literature and case law, this means that the court needs to assess
whether the consideration for the creditors is significantly less than that given in a liquidation of the debtor's
assets. 140  Moreover, the proposed Section 373 Fw contains a safeguard for creditors and shareholders in
the context of a compulsory composition (dwangakkoord). It provides that a court may refuse declaring
a rejected compulsory composition generally binding if, in brief, classes of creditors and shareholders
who rejected the composition would receive less than the payments they would receive in a hypothetical
liquidation procedure. 141
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Unlike the approach followed by the Fw, however, the decision whether the resolution measures are taken
and creditors and shareholders are bailed-in is in principle not dependent on the outcome of the valuation
under the ncwo principle. Under the BRRD and SRM Regulation, creditors and shareholders are only
compensated for any difference between the treatment in resolution and a liquidation procedure. 142  Thus,
if it is likely that a bank's shareholders would not have received anything in a liquidation of the bank,
a cancellation of their shares by a resolution authority does not place them in a worse position and no
compensation is awarded. 143  It has been noted, however, that this does not mean that a resolution authority
may not be cautious in the implementation of specific resolution measures. Its decision is likely to be
based on preliminary valuations and hypothetical assumptions and the going concern perspective of the
bail-in rules may require a large amount of liabilities to be bailed-in to ensure that a bank is sufficiently
recapitalised, 144  which may not always correspond with the gone concern approach that forms the basis
for the valuation under the ncwo principle. 145  It has been argued that the resolution authorities clearly
have some flexibility in the exercise of their write-down and conversion powers if the valuation shows that
the value of the bank's assets would be impaired significantly if the bank was placed in liquidation and that
the creditors, therefore, would not have been paid back in full. 146  Yet, the announcement of the liquidators
of the Dutch DSB Bank, which failed in 2009, that they expect that the bank's senior unsecured creditors
are going to be paid in full and that there is a chance that subordinated creditors can be fully paid in the end
as well illustrates that it is not self-evident that a bank's creditors suffer significant losses in a liquidation
procedure. 147
4.1.2. Developments towards financial restructuring outside traditional full-fledged (bank) insolvency
procedures
Financial restructuring outside traditional full-fledged corporate insolvency procedures
An EU framework that deals with private international law issues in cross-border insolvency procedures
is already in place for debtors other than certain types of financial institutions since 2002, 148  but
harmonisation of substantive insolvency law in the EU was long considered difficult to achieve. 149  The
set-up and operation of general corporate insolvency procedures was, and to a large extent still is, left
to national legislatures. More recently, several studies concluded that a certain degree of convergence of
national substantive insolvency law is preferable and a process directed towards further harmonisation
of specific areas of corporate insolvency law was set in motion at EU level. 150  One of the areas the
European Commission currently focuses on is ‘preventive restructuring frameworks’. In November 2016
it published a proposal for a directive which, inter alia, aims to ensure ‘[…] that viable enterprises in
financial difficulties have access to effective national preventive restructuring frameworks which enable
them to continue operating.’ 151  According to the proposal, the main aims of these frameworks would
include enabling the avoidance of the insolvency of a company so as to maximise the total value to creditors,
employees, owners and the economy as a whole and prevent unnecessary losses of jobs, knowledge and
skills. 152  They should facilitate the restructuring 153  of corporate debtors 154  ‘where there is likelihood of
insolvency’. 155  More in particular, the frameworks should allow the adoption of a financial restructuring
plan by a majority of the debtor's creditors that can bind dissenting classes of creditors if it is confirmed
by a judicial or administrative authority at the end of the process and the latter creditors are not worse off
than in a liquidation of the debtor's business. 156  Shareholders may, rather than shall, be allowed to vote
on the adoption of the plan in a separate class. 157
The described developments towards the facilitation of a restructuring of a non-financial corporate debtor's
debts or business as an alternative to formal insolvency procedures cannot be studied in isolation from
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national developments in the field of corporate insolvency law. Driven by regulatory competition as well
as developments during the recent financial crisis, many EU Member States have recently introduced or
proposed laws to reform their national insolvency legislation. 158  Literature indicates that in most of these
jurisdictions procedures have been introduced that allow a restructuring or reorganisation of a debtor's
business. 159  Common tendencies of insolvency procedures in some Member States several years ago
included already that a composition or arrangement that is negotiated amongst the creditors can be made
binding on a dissenting minority, that a reorganisation or restructuring procedure can be started at an early
stage and the possibility that a moratorium or stay is imposed and a conversion of creditor claims into share
capital is arranged. 160
At this moment, Dutch law does not provide for an effective statutory tool to force dissenting creditors
outside a formal insolvency procedure to agree with a financial restructuring. 161  An informal out-of-court
composition (akkoord) qualifies as a multiparty agreement and is governed by general rules of private
law. 162  The Fw allows an insolvent non-financial corporate debtor to propose a composition scheme
to its creditors within a liquidation procedure or suspension of payments procedure but the scheme is
upon confirmation by the court only binding to the non-secured creditors without preferential rights. 163
Yet, in 2012 the Dutch legislature launched the legislative programme Recalibration of Bankruptcy law
(Herijking Faillissementsrecht), which, inter alia, aims to amend the Fw so as to implement a legal basis
for a compulsory composition outside a formal suspension of payments or liquidation procedure. 164
According to the proposal, creditors and shareholders would vote in separate classes and may both be
bound to a restructuring plan if the composition is declared binding by the court, which can also approve
the composition if it has not been accepted but the classes who voted against ‘could not have reasonably
voted the way they did’. 165  As was noted in the previous paragraph, the proposal adds that a negative vote
of a class cannot be overruled if, in short, the class of creditors or shareholders would receive less from the
composition than through the liquidation of the company. 166  It explicitly provides that the scheme may
provide for a limitation of the rights of creditors and shareholders, including a waiver of a part of the claims
or an exclusion of pre-emption rights. 167
Financial restructuring outside traditional full-fledged bank insolvency procedures
As has been discussed above, facilitating an early restructuring and reorganisation has also been at the heart
of the reforms in the field of bank insolvency law in the EU the last few years. Put differently, both in the
field of general corporate insolvency law and bank insolvency law the EU legislature and some Member
States' legislatures have sought to supplement traditional formal insolvency procedures with some form
of ex-ante measures. 168  Member States' insolvency procedures for non-financial corporate debtors and
banks continue to show significant differences in objectives, form and content. 169  Yet, common underlying
policy goals in both areas of law at EU level as well as in several EU countries have been that restructuring
procedures need to be open at an early stage of financial distress so as to preserve a company's viable business
and avoid a failure. It resulted in both fields of law in (proposals for) procedures in which creditors and
shareholders can be forced to agree to certain measures, although, as has been noted in literature, in the
field of bank resolution law the adoption of a reorganisation or restructuring plan is not left to a creditors'
vote and a court confirmation but to an administrative decision. 170
Already in the years before the BRRD required Member States to amend their bank insolvency legislation,
European jurisdictions introduced national bank resolution regimes to expand the options and tools
available to national authorities to restructure a failing bank's business before the moment of commencing
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formal insolvency procedures. 171  In the Netherlands, for instance, liquidation was basically one of the only
options for a failing bank under Dutch bank insolvency law for a long time. 172  Yet, in 2012 the domestic
bank insolvency framework was amended to expand the expand the tools and powers available to national
authorities to preserve a failing bank's business. The Intervention Act (Interventiewet) empowered DNB to
transfer shares issued by or assets and liabilities of a failing bank to another bank or a bridge bank under
Part 3 Wft. 173  The Act also introduced Section 6:2 Wft, which empowers the Dutch Minister of Finance
to expropriate securities issued by or issued with the cooperation of a bank or assets and/or liabilities of a
bank if the situation of that bank is posing a serious and immediate threat to the stability of the financial
system. 174  Although the rules of the BRRD on the bail-in mechanism were only implemented in the Wft
in November 2015, in 2013 the application of the new expropriation tool already resulted in investors being
forced to accept the reorganisation measures and bearing a share in the costs of the recapitalisation of
a bank. Both the first application of the tool in relation to financial conglomerate SNS Reaal and the
introduction of the bail-in mechanism under the BRRD sparked a fierce debate about the question to
what extent investors in senior debt, besides the shareholders and subordinated creditors, should contribute
towards a recapitalisation of a bank. In the former case, the Dutch Minister of Finance offered expropriated
subordinated creditors and shareholders no compensation. If the expropriation decision would not have
been taken, SNS Reaal would have been liquidated and, according to the Minister, in that case hardly any
proceeds from the realisation of assets would have been available for distribution to the shareholders and
creditors. 175  Awaiting the final court judgement on the compensation amount, 176  the former subordinated
creditors and shareholders of SNS Reaal are considered to have lost their investments and are considered
to have been de facto bailed-in. 177
4.2. Some technicalities and effects of bail-in that require further alignment with national private law
4.2.1. Effects debt write-down
Article 53(3) BRRD provides what is the effect of a full write-down of creditors' claims against a bank by
a resolution authority. If the principal amount of or outstanding amount payable in respect of a bank's
liability is reduced to zero, the liability as well as any obligations or claims arising in relation to it that are
not accrued at the time when the power is exercised, are treated as discharged for all purposes and shall not
be provable in any subsequent procedure in relation to the bank under resolution or any successor in any
subsequent winding-up. If the liability is only partly written down, under Article 53(4) BRRD the liability
is treated as discharged to the extent the amount is reduced and the relevant instrument or agreement that
created the original liability continues to apply in relation to the residual amount. Literature has not devoted
much attention to the meaning of these provisions, including the meaning of the phrases ‘any obligations
or claims arising in relation to it’ and ‘for all purposes’. 178  It is the author's view that the provisions seek
to ensure that if a claim against a bank is written down, the bailed-in (part of the) debt can no longer be
collected from this bank. Article 53(3) and (4) BRRD does not interfere in the relationship with a third
party who guarantees a bank's debt obligations.
In this view, a bank's creditor whose claim is written down does not lose the ability to claim against a
surety (borg) in accordance with Section 7:850(1) BW. He has a claim against the surety because the bank as
principal debtor was not able to pay off its debts as the claims were bailed-in. 179  However, under this view
the claim against the bank of a surety who satisfied the creditor, including the surety who subrogated into
the rights of the creditor under Section 7:866 BW, is treated as discharged as it concerns a claim against the
bailed-in bank. 180  It is questionable whether the legislative history to Section 3a:25 Wft, which transposes
Article 53(3) and (4) BRRD into Dutch law, is correct in indicating that if the bank and another debtor
are jointly and severally liable, a write-down of the claim against the bank discharges the other joint and
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several debtor from his obligation against the creditor. 181  By contrast, it is the author's view that if a
parent company has issued a so-called ‘403 statement’ (403-verklaring), i.e. a statement under which the
parent company assumes joint and several liability for certain debts of its subsidiaries in accordance with
Section 2:403 BW, a creditor can seek recourse against the parent company if the subsidiary's liabilities have
been bailed-in. 182  It has been argued that intra-group guarantees may put the effectiveness of a resolution
strategy at risk, for instance because a parent company has guaranteed its subsidiaries' bail-inable debt and a
write-down of a subsidiary's liabilities may result in claims under the guarantee and difficulties in separating
different group entities and functions in a resolution procedure. 183  Yet, these effects can be avoided by
bailing-in the claim under the guarantee as well. Moreover, in literature doubts have arisen whether ‘any
obligations or claims arising in relation to it’ can include the obligations of a protection seller under a credit
default swap. 184  If Article 53(3) and (4) BRRD and Section 3a:25 Wft do not limit the hedging possibilities
of an investor in bail-inable debt through credit default swaps, for the sake of clarity the investor may prefer
to include in the contract that the application of the resolution authority's write-down powers in relation
to has claim constitutes an event of default. 185
4.2.2. Effects conversion of claims
The question arises why only a write-down of a bank's liabilities would not be sufficient to recapitalise the
bank. 186  Although losses can be absorbed in this way, the BRRD and SRM Regulation explicitly require
that any write-down to repair a negative equity value starts with a reduction of equity before liabilities
can be written down. 187  Moreover, the effect would be advantageous to the bank's existing shareholders
because their share in the company's capital would not be affected and they may possibly benefit if the value
of the company increases in the future while the resolution principle that shareholders bear the first losses
is not adhered to. It follows that the power to reduce a bank's liabilities is logically linked to the powers to
reduce equity and convert debt into equity. 188
It has been noted that the BRRD requires national law to guide the formalities of the conversion. 189  Yet,
Section 3a:6 Wft, which implements Articles 54(3) and 63(2) BRRD, provides that, apart from certain
exceptions, a resolution order is not subject to any approval, procedural or notification requirement and
company law provisions on shareholders' voting rights or the general meeting of shareholders do not
apply. 190  Moreover, the application of the bail-in mechanism is not subject to any procedural impediment
existing by virtue of law, statutes or contract, such as requirements on the authorised share capital of a
company. Thus, if for the exercise of the conversion powers new shares need to be issued, these requirements
are not considered an impediment to the issuance in excess of this maximum amount of share capital. 191  It
is the author's view that if creditors' claims are converted into shares, the claims are not assigned to the bank
or set-off against the obligation of making capital contributions as would generally be the case in a debt to
equity swap under Dutch law. 192  The conversion would apply by operation of law. 193  Bail-in under the
Wft needs to be considered a measure sui generis which is for its application not dependent on the above-
mentioned requirements contained in Dutch company law. In essence the effect of the conversion is similar
to the effect of the write-down of a claim as the claim itself extinguishes. 194
Another important question is what the value of the equity stake is each bailed-in creditor should receive
in exchange of his claim. 195  It has been noted that this assessment initially depends on the value of the
claim that is converted, on the ratio of the value of this claim to the value of the other claims, and, where
relevant, on the value of the share capital represented by the ‘old’ shareholders, i.e. shareholders who have
not been ‘wiped-out’ in the application of the bail-in mechanism. 196  By way of example, according to the
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Dutch doctrinal majority opinion, which view is not the prevailing view in all EU Member States, 197  in
a debt-to-equity swap governed by general company law the nominal value of a claim — rather than for
instance the amount the company is able to pay or the claim's market value — is the relevant value in the
determination how much corresponding equity value is created. 198  This means that even if the company
would not have been able to pay a creditor back in full, the creditor would receive shares in the company
for the claim's nominal value. 199  By contrast, the BRRD, the SRM Regulation and the European Banking
Authority (‘EBA’)'s draft regulatory technical standards on valuation under the BRRD seem to require
that a resolution authority takes into account other types of valuations of creditors' claims too. The former
two provide that the valuation of a bank's assets and liabilities to decide on the application of the bail-in
mechanism and the extent of the write-down and conversion should be based on ‘fair, prudent and realistic’
assumptions. 200  The draft standards emphasise the need to assess the economic value to ensure that all
losses are recognised, which value may, according to the standards, deviate from the value presented in
financial statements. 201
Besides assessing the value of the creditors' claims, the resolution authority needs to determine the
conversion rate of debt to equity. 202  Article 50 BRRD provides in this context that the rate may be
different for different classes of capital instruments and liabilities, provided that (i) it represents appropriate
compensation to the affected creditors for any loss incurred and/or (ii) the conversion rate for liabilities
that are considered senior under national insolvency law is higher than for liabilities that are treated
subordinated. According to the EBA in its draft guidelines on the conversion rate under the BRRD, this
means that authorities should seek to ensure that creditors and shareholders receive at least the value which
they would have received had the bank been wound up under national insolvency law (the ncwo principle)
as well as that the creditor hierarchy is fully respected. 203  Thus, in principle each euro of subordinated
creditors' claims should not receive more value of remaining debt and common equity claims than each euro
of senior creditors' claims would receive. 204  According to the EBA, the determination of the equity value
that is distributed to bailed-in creditors is to be based on the estimated market price of the shares. 205
Valuation methods, and more in particular the fact that in a debt restructuring procedure often only an
estimated valuation of a corporate debtor's business can be advanced, does not only receive attention of
lawyers specialised in bank resolution. For example, as was discussed in paragraph 4.1.1, if a composition
scheme within a liquidation procedure or suspension of payments procedure under the Fw has been
approved by the creditors, the court is required to make a valuation of the estate's assets to determine
whether the assets considerably exceed the sum proposed in the scheme. 206  Moreover, in insolvency law
literature several alternatives have been proposed to overcome the uncertainties related to and disputes
about valuation in reorganisation procedures, 207  including the system with option rights to the company's
shares for the different classes of shareholders and creditors that was proposed almost 30 years ago by
Bebchuk. 208  According to the latter proposal, the most junior class with shareholders can exercise the
options against an exercise price equal to the value of all claims in the higher ranked assets. If they do,
they are provided the shares and the company's creditors are paid in full. If they do not wish to exercise
their options, the creditors in a more senior class are given to option to buy the shares, which process
continues until all shares are sold. Whether the holders of the rights exercise the options depends on their
own estimation of the company's value. 209  Thus, by exercising their options shareholders and creditors
who do not belong to the most senior class invest additional capital in the company. The participants can
also sell their options in the market or use the equity as collateral to first borrow the money needed to
become shareholder. 210  In another well-known proposal of Roe, only a small part of the company's shares
is first issued to the public. Based on the proceeds, the company's value is determined and the remaining
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shares are distributed to the company's creditors in accordance with the order of priority. 211  Thus, both
proposals rely on a form of market pricing.
Against this background, it cannot be a coincidence that DNB published a proposal on the operation of bail-
in in the Netherlands with its own market-based solution. According to the proposal, part of the application
of the bail-in mechanism is the conversion of claims into rights to newly issued shares in the bank under
resolution. Thus, claims that, according to the resolution authority, need to be converted into equity to
recapitalise the bank are first converted into claim rights. Until these option rights are exercised, which may
be traded in the market as in Bebchuk's proposal, the newly issued shares are placed by the bank with a
foundation. 212  Interestingly, this method does not only provide the resolution authority time to verify who
the bank's creditors are as well as the creditors time to sell their positions if they do not want to or are not
allowed to become shareholder of the bank. 213  In a resolution procedure creditors and shareholders in
principle do not have the chance to bargain over how much of the pie they are entitled to. Since the claim
rights will have a certain value in the market, it is the author's view that the proposed method can ensure
that the resolution authority has an impression of what the value of the bank in the market is and may,
thereupon, help in deciding how much equity the bailed-in creditors should receive in exchange for their
claim rights. However, although the proposed method is potentially useful in a bank resolution procedure,
it is still unclear how the final text of DNB's approach to bail-in will look like and Dutch insolvency law
does not have experience with such a market based method. 214  Moreover, it has been argued that for the
sake of clarity a procedure in which the conversion of claims is directly implemented may be advocated
instead of the described procedure with claim rights. 215
4.2.3. The hierarchy of claims in bail-in
The hierarchy of claims under the BRRD
Fundamental question in the design of a bank resolution framework is how the losses and costs of the
recapitalisation of a bank under resolution should be allocated among all stakeholders. 216  An order
of priority of claims traditionally determines who are paid first out of the available pool of assets in a
liquidation procedure under insolvency law, but in many jurisdictions this ranking or hierarchy is already
also of relevance in other types of insolvency procedures, such as for the formation of classes of creditors
in a reorganisation procedure. 217  It has been noted that priorities recognised in an insolvency procedure
generally reflect legal, social or moral decisions made and policy goals pursued in a specific jurisdiction,
such as the protection of employees' claims for unpaid wages, 218  and have often been developed over a long
period of time. 219  Following the distributional rules traditionally applicable in an insolvency procedure, it
seems fair to assume that in most EU Member States shareholders would first be subject to bail-in, secondly
subordinated creditors and thirdly unsecured, non-preferred creditors. 220  Moreover, creditors who are
granted priority in insolvency, which may include tax authorities, would be part of the group of creditors
standing at the end of the line of creditors potentially subject to bail-in. This approach corresponds perfectly
with the idea that creditors should not become worse off as a result of bail-in than in liquidation. 221
However, it has been argued that in a resolution procedure public interests may need to be prioritised over
the interests of the creditors inter se, which justifies a more functional approach. 222  Liabilities subject to
contagion risks, such as deposits, as well as liabilities arising from certain essential services and business
lines may need to be excluded from bail-in to avoid that risks are spread to other parts of the financial sector
and bank runs occur as well as to enable the bank to continue its viable day-to-day operations. 223  Thus, in
the latter approach all liabilities of the bank can be made subject to write-down and conversion powers but
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some liabilities are exempted. 224  Although this would mean that the latter liabilities preserve their original
position in liquidation, in bail-in they are treated de facto senior to liabilities that are ‘bail-inable’. 225
The BRRD and SRM Regulation follow a combination of the two mentioned approaches. 226  In addition,
they require that losses are imposed on capital instruments that count as AT1 and T2 instruments, which are
subordinated claims of investors in the bank, before other subordinated liabilities. 227  Only if AT1 and T2
instruments are reduced in full, other subordinated debt, including capital instruments that do not meet the
criteria for AT1 or T2 instruments under CRR, 228  and senior debt are reduced or converted in ascending
order under national law. It is the author's view that four resolution principles set out in Article 34 BRRD
and Article 15 SRM Regulation are relevant in this context: (i) the shareholders of the bank under resolution
bear first losses; (ii) the creditors of the bank bear losses after the shareholders, in accordance with the
hierarchy of claims under insolvency law, unless otherwise provided; (iii) the creditors in the same class are
treated in an equitable manner, unless otherwise provided; and (iv) covered deposits are fully protected. 229
The latter principle is complied with through the creation of depositor preference, which is further discussed
below, as well as the exemption of that part of deposits covered by a deposit guarantee scheme from the scope
of the bail-in mechanism. 230  Other liabilities excluded from bail-in under the BRRD and SRM Regulation
are (i) secured liabilities, 231  (ii) liabilities arising from the holding of client assets or from the bank acting as
a fiduciary in a fiduciary relationship, (iii) short-term liabilities to other institutions, (iv) short-term liabilities
owed to payment and securities settlement systems, and (v) liabilities owed to employees, to commercial and
trade creditors, to tax and social security authorities and to deposit guarantee schemes. 232  Furthermore, the
resolution authorities also have some discretion to exclude or partially exclude other liabilities in exceptional
circumstances themselves in the resolution of a specific bank, and, accordingly, grant different treatment to
claims that would rank equally in liquidation. The exclusion is for instance allowed if it is strictly necessary
and proportionate to achieve the continuity of critical functions and core business lines. 233  The BRRD
and SRM Regulation explicitly indicate that this may mean that the level of write down or conversion of
non-excluded instruments and liabilities needs to be increased, but the ncwo principle needs to be complied
with. 234
The general insolvency ranking of claims under national law
Against this background, the question arises how the hierarchy of bail-inable liabilities under the BRRD
and SRM Regulation relates to the general insolvency ranking of claims under national law. 235  Most of
the Dutch provisions that grant priorities to certain types of creditors or claims can be found in the BW and
specific statutes rather than the Fw. 236  Central principles of the BW are that a creditor can have recourse
for his claim against all property of his debtor, unless otherwise provided by law or agreement (Section
3:276 BW) as well as that creditors, in principle, have, amongst each other and in proportion to the amount
of their claims, an equal right to be paid from the net proceeds of the assets of the debtor (Section 3:277
BW). 237  Section 3:278 BW, however, provides that creditors who can assert a right of pledge, mortgage,
preferential right (voorrecht), 238  or another statutory ground for priority such as the possessory lien 239
(retentierecht) are granted priority. Accordingly, in case of a ‘concursus creditorum’ a right of mortgage
or right of pledge can be exercised as if the insolvency procedure had not been opened and tax authorities
and employees have, among others, a right to preferential payment. 240  Claims against the insolvency estate
(boedelvorderingen), i.e. essentially the costs of the insolvency procedure, 241  are to be paid in priority to all
insolvency claims. 242  Furthermore, several other instruments, such as set-off rights, grant creditors quasi-
priority (feitelijke preferentie). 243  It has been noted that most of the priorities granted under Dutch law
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can be historically explained and that the reasons that for instance have been put forward in legislative
history for the priority status of tax claims include that the public treasury cannot choose its debtors. 244
The result is a complex system with many classes of creditors that need to be paid in priority to the ordinary
unsecured, non-preferential insolvency creditors and the latter group of creditors often receives nothing in
a liquidation procedure. 245  Several authors believe that the principle that creditors have equal rights to
proportional payment does not amount that much under Dutch insolvency law. 246  Proposals to change
the current system for the distribution of the realisation proceeds, for instance by limiting the scope of the
administration claims (boedelvorderingen) and preferential claims, 247  have been very much debated in legal
literature but no significant changes have been adopted so far. 248
As has been shown above, the bank resolution rules provide that creditors of the same class are to be
treated in an equitable, rather than equal, manner 249  and grant de facto priority to several categories
of liabilities by excluding them from bail-in. 250  Some of the excluded liabilities enjoy priority treatment
under Dutch insolvency law, including liabilities to employees in relation to accrued salary, while other
separate categories of liabilities, such as short term liabilities, are alien to the insolvency ranking of claims
under Dutch law. 251  Moreover, the differences between the treatment of a bank's liabilities in bail-in and
in liquidation may increase further if resolution authorities decide to exercise the discussed discretionary
exclusions of certain liabilities from bail-in.
Specific attention needs to be paid in that context to Article 108 BRRD, which further aligns the position
of depositors and deposit guarantee schemes in insolvency procedures with their position in bail-in by
requiring the insertion of two rungs to the insolvency ranking of claims under national law. 252  It has been
argued that the decision to exclude deposits from bail-in only up to the amount deposits are covered by the
deposit guarantee scheme accords with the idea that the economic effects of a formal insolvency procedure
for the bank's creditors should be replicated in a resolution procedure as far as possible. 253  However, if
covered deposits would only be excluded from the scope of bail-in, in a liquidation of the bank's assets under
a Member State's insolvency law they are likely to rank equally with ordinary unsecured, non-preferred
claims. The probability that creditors are entitled to compensation under the ncwo principle would then
increase if the latter claims are bailed-in because the class of liabilities that can be touched in bail-in has
become smaller. 254  This justifies granting deposits from natural persons or micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises a priority ranking in insolvency procedures which is higher than the ranking of the unsecured,
non-preferred claims. 255  Moreover, Article 108 BRRD provides that the part of these deposits that is
covered by a deposit guarantee scheme has a ranking which is even higher than the ranking of the part that
is not covered. A deposit guarantee scheme subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors
has the same preferred position as covered depositors. It has been noted that the BRRD leaves to national
law the determination what a ‘high priority ranking’ means in this regard and how the priority position of
depositors relates to the preferential positions of other creditors. 256  It is questionable whether the leeway
left to Member States in this respect is fully consistent with the aim of the BRRD to protect depositors
and deposit guarantee schemes and give them a priority status. 257  For example, under Section 212ra Fw
the claims set out in Article 108 BRRD have a preferential position (‘zijn bevoorrecht’ 258 ) and are paid
from the proceeds available in liquidation after the preferential insolvency claims listed in Section 3:288
BW, which include claims for wages relating to the work performed prior to the commencement of the
insolvency procedure. Consequently, under Dutch law depositors and deposit guarantee schemes can assert
a preferential right (voorrecht) in accordance with Section 3:278 BW but stand at the bottom of the class of
preferential insolvency claims and are in a liquidation procedure only paid after all administration claims
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and other insolvency claims on the list of claims with priority treatment. 259  In a liquidation procedure under
Dutch law distributions are often hardly made to all preferential creditors. 260  However, the liquidation of
DSB Bank, as was already referred to in paragraph 4.1.1, shows that in practice this may be different in a
procedure for liquidation of a bank's assets.
Further alignment hierarchy of claims in bail-in and liquidation
Article 108 BRRD contributes to the further alignment of the position of depositors and deposit guarantee
schemes in resolution with their position in liquidation. 261  Yet, it has been acknowledged in literature that
the differences that still exist between the hierarchy and pool of claims that can be made subject to bail-in
and the ranking of claims recognised under national insolvency law as well as the fact that Member States
take different approaches to the insolvency ranking of claims create several complications. 262  Firstly, the
differences in the treatment of creditors and claims in liquidation under national laws may lead to differences
in the application of the bail-in mechanism and may undermine authorities' incentives for cross-border
cooperation. 263  The resolution authorities need to decide in each resolution procedure which national
insolvency law is applicable to determine the ranking of claims, which decision may become very complex
in case of large and internationally operating banks and which makes it difficult for creditors to assess
whether their claims might be bailed-in. 264  By way of example, given that under the BRRD liabilities to
tax authorities are only excluded from the scope of the bail-in tool if the liabilities are awarded preferential
treatment under national law, these liabilities fall within the scope of the bail-in tool under the Wft but are
not bail-inable in Member States in which tax claims are not granted priority. 265  Secondly, the BRRD
excludes liabilities such as unsecured liabilities to trade creditors from the scope of bail-in and debt linked to
derivatives counterparties may be excluded by the resolution authority given the risks of contagion in case of
an abrupt termination of derivatives transactions. 266  However, as has been noted in literature, these claims
would in a liquidation procedure traditionally be on equal footing with the claims of general unsecured
creditors that are not protected in bail-in. 267  Thus, in a bail-in of the claims of the latter group of creditors
the risk exists that this group has a claim under the ncwo principle and that compensation may have to be
paid as the group of creditors that bears the losses has become smaller, unless the losses that would otherwise
be imposed on the mentioned excluded creditors are imposed on an external party. 268  Related to this point,
the BRRD creates a ranking within the layer of a bank's subordinated liabilities. Insolvency law traditionally
does not make a distinction between debt instruments that meet the regulatory capital requirements (CET1,
AT1 and T2 capital) on the one hand and other shares and subordinated liabilities on the other hand. Again,
if national insolvency law does not follow the same ranking of creditor claims in liquidation, the risk exists
that the exercise of the write-down and conversion powers results in certain subordinated creditors being
disadvantaged compared to their position in a hypothetical liquidation procedure. 269
Against this background, part of the amendments to the BRRD that were recently proposed by the
European Commission is the proposal to add a paragraph to Article 108 BRRD, which aims to facilitate
that the class of unsecured, non-preferred debt of banks can be split in two layers. According to the proposal,
relevant contractual documentation of a bank should provide that certain short-term claims resulting from
debt instruments that have no derivative features rank in insolvency below other senior unsecured claims
resulting from debt instruments but higher than the classes of subordinated claims against a bank. 270
Following the applicable ranking of claims in insolvency procedures, in this way the new class of claims can
be bailed-in immediately after contractually or statutory subordinated claims but before claims exempted
from bail-in, while the chance that resolution authorities need to treat claims with an equal ranking in
liquidation in an unequal manner in bail-in is reduced. Moreover, the provision would facilitate the banks'
compliance with the MREL requirements, especially because the provisions on MREL allow resolution
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authorities to require that MREL is met with instruments that rank in insolvency procedures below liabilities
that are excluded from bail-in or may be excluded from bail-in by the resolution authority. 271
Although it has been argued that national legislation governing the insolvency ranking of claims against
a bank should be fully harmonised at EU level, 272  according to others this is politically not feasible at
the moment. 273  Arguably, the fact that priorities recognised by national insolvency law can generally be
justified on specific historical, cultural or policy grounds and are strongly intertwined with entitlements and
priorities granted in other areas of law, such as security rights or privileges attached to tax claims under tax
law, also shows that any harmonisation effort would need to deal with significant challenges. 274  Moreover,
it has been submitted that even if the distributional rules in liquidation are fully harmonised, differences
may remain to exist since Member States may still protect certain types of creditors outside insolvency law,
for instance via social security mechanisms. 275  The mentioned Commission's proposal, however, does not
require a statutory subordination but only deals with a contractual solution. 276  It does not interfere into
the many other areas of law that insolvency law interfaces and stays away from, for instance, harmonisation
of all general private law priorities. 277  In the present author's view, the proposal illustrates that there is
openness — at least at EU level — towards further alignment of the treatment of specific classes of claims
against banks under general insolvency law with their treatment in resolution.
5. Conclusion
The BRRD and SRM Regulation have introduced a complex EU bank resolution framework in which
public interests may be given preference to individual interests, court involvement has been minimised and
administrative resolution authorities have a wide range of tools and powers at their disposal to intervene
in and reorganise a failing bank. This article highlighted that this framework does not function as a stand-
alone substitute for Member States' insolvency laws but more general areas of national private law, in
particular insolvency law, play an essential role in the interpretation and application of the bank resolution
rules. 278  Moreover, it was discussed that the prevailing view in policy and academic discussions at the
moment is that there is a need for further alignment of national substantive insolvency law with the bank
resolution framework, while at the same time it is recognised that harmonisation efforts in the field of
insolvency law face significant challenges. Against that background, the article examined that to what extent
the bail-in rules, principles and objectives provided by the SRM Regulation and the implemented BRRD
are in coherence with more general areas of Dutch private law. The analysis can be relevant for other EU
Member States than the Netherlands as well. Moreover, it can serve as a basis for projects that aim at further
development and harmonisation of the bank resolution framework and discuss which elements of national
private law should be included in any future EU legislative instrument in that regard.
The ultimate objectives of the bank resolution rules are to a certain extent different than those of general
corporate insolvency law. Yet, since in both Dutch general corporate insolvency law and bank insolvency
law there has been a general trend towards the facilitation of early restructuring as an alternative to
liquidation of a debtor's business as a whole while possibilities for shareholders and creditors to block
restructuring measures are reduced under certain circumstances, it seems fair to say that both areas of
law share some underlying policy goals. Moreover, it was shown that most of the resolution principles
provided by the bank resolution rules can be found implicitly or explicitly in a similar form in Dutch
general insolvency law. However, this contribution also revealed that several other relationships between
the bail-in rules and more general areas of Dutch private law are inconsistent or unclear. The role and
effect of guarantees in case of a write-down of creditor claims against a bank need clarification. Moreover,
it was argued that the proposed procedure for the conversion of a bank's debts can be potentially useful
to overcome issues related to valuation but its final design is not yet known and the procedure would
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derogate from the existing Dutch insolvency law practice. Finally, Section 212ra Fw contributes and the
proposed amendments to Article 108 BRRD are likely to contribute to the further alignment of the order
of priority of claims recognised under national insolvency law with the hierarchy and pool of claims that
can be made subject to bail-in under the bank resolution rules. Yet, the author maintains that the remaining
differences between the two fields make the application of bail-in and related safeguards for all parties
involved, including shareholders, creditors and authorities, less transparent and more complex.
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